Abstract. Both life history theory and demographic transition theory predict that fertility responds to changes in mortality, but there have been relatively few tests which identify links between mortality perceptions and fertility preferences at the individual level. This paper provides an individual-level investigation of the relationship between mortality and fertility, by testing whether mortality priming results in an increase in fertility preferences. Data were collected via an internet-based experiment of students at the London School of Economics (LSE), who were randomly allocated between two questionnaires. The treatment questionnaire asked a set of mortality priming questions and then collected information on fertility preferences and attitudes towards the costs and benefits of children. The control questionnaire recorded information on fertility preferences without prior mortality priming. The results suggest that mortality priming resulted in higher ideal number of children for males, but not for females. There were no significant differences in the attitudes towards the costs and benefits of children for either sex, though the raw data suggest a slight shift towards viewing children as less costly after mortality-priming, particularly for men. This paper therefore argues that the reaction of fertility to mortality may be at least partly mediated by a direct psychological link between mortality perceptions and reproductive behaviour.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are only two events that are inevitable in the life of every human being: birth and death. Population science has from its inception made strong causal links be-tween fertility and mortality (NI BHROLCHAIN and DYSON 2007) . The seminal ideas of Thomas Malthus, developed at the end of the 18 th century, revolved around how population growth is kept in line with its resource base by any increases (or decreases) in fertility being matched with increases (or decreases) in mortality, and vice versa (KNUTSEN 2003) . In the post-WWII period demographic transition theory was developed, which highlighted that declines in fertility rates are preceded by declines in mortality. Because of the time order of the changes an implicit causal argument was developed, whereby fertility decline was linked as an underlying 'demographic response' to changes in mortality (e.g. DAVIS 1963; CASTERLINE 2003; CLELAND 2001) Both Malthusian and demographic transition theories are focused at the macrolevel, and their causal claims have recently lost impact within population research, because of the scarcity of evidence demonstrating any mortality-fertility relationship at the individual level. Explaining fertility levels has now moved on to numerous other factors and models, for example: intergenerational wealth flows (CALD-WELL 1982) , micro-economic 'household' models (BECKER 1991) , diffusion and cultural change (CLELAND and WILSON 1987) , the effectiveness of family planning programmes (FREEDMAN 1997) , changes in gender equality (MCDONALD 2000) and social structures (NEWSON et al. 2005) , to name but a few. Few of these theories, however, incorporate evolutionary ideas into their models. Here, we argue that the incorporation of evolutionary theory is important to understanding fertility decline, and revisit the relationship between mortality perceptions and fertility preferences at the individual level, using the theoretical framework of life history theory.
A key element of human behaviour is its relative flexibility to varying environmental conditions (LALAND and BROWN 2002; SMITH and WINTERHALDER 1992; BORGERHOFF MULDER 1991) , an ability which has allowed us to colonise diverse environments successfully (WELLS and STOCK 2007) . Hence fertility and reproductive decision-making is expected to vary under different environmental conditions. Life history theory predicts that fertility behaviour is likely to be particularly sensitive to mortality levels and patterns, given the key importance of mortality in determining the payoffs to life history decisions such as when to stop growing and reproducing, how to allocate investment between quantity and quality of children, etc. (e.g. STEARNS 2000) . High and unpredictable mortality regimes are likely to favour an early start to reproduction and high fertility, whereas low and stable mortality is predicted to lead to later and lower fertility. An early start to reproduction is necessary where the risk of dying before reproductive maturity is high, and, given the high parental investment needed in human children, high mortality will select for parents who spread their investment across many, albeit low quality, children, in order to mitigate against the risk of all children dying before they can successfully reproduce. Conversely, under more benign mortality conditions, a later start to reproduction may be favoured (allowing a longer growth period) and parents should reduce the number of offspring, to avoid diluting parental investment across too many surviving children: such dilution of parental investment risks weakening the competitiveness of children and their ability to successfully mate and reproduce.
So, both demography and life history suggest that a shift towards lower fertility will be seen under low mortality conditions -but how might this effect be brought about? There is, of course, a direct physiological relationship between mortality and fertility. In natural fertility societies, birth intervals are considerably shorter after a stillbirth or neonatal death than after a child who survives for some time after birth: ovulation resumes much more quickly in the absence of a surviving child, because there is no inhibiting effect of lactation on ovulation (e.g. RONSMANS 1996; GUZ and HOBCRAFT 1991) . But our species has a long history of manipulating the probability of conception, even in the absence of effective modern contraception. Which leaves open the possibility that our evolved psychological mechanisms may respond to changing mortality conditions, by a preference for higher fertility in high mortality conditions and lower fertility under low mortality. We therefore suggest that the processes given in Figure 1 may link mortality to fertility at the individual level. This research will focus upon establishing part B of the chain. The link between desires and preferences for children and actualised fertility in part C of the chain is likely to be complicated, certainly in the context of fertility negotiations being made between males and females (SMALLWOOD and JEFFERIES 2003; KOHLER et al. 2005; BERRINGTON 2004 ) but for the purposes of this paper we will simply assume that there is such a link between desired and realised fertility preferences, and concentrate on arrow B. Part A may also not be entirely straightforward. There is relatively little research on how accurately individuals perceive mortality risks, though there may be various biases which affect accuracy of mortality perceptions (MONTGOMERY 2000) . In recent years, for example, media coverage of events where individuals have died, such as natural disasters and terrorist attacks, could induce perceptions of mortality in excess of the actual lives lost. There has been a popular assumption that the September 11th terrorist attacks resulted in an increase in fertility in New York and the wider United States (MSNBC 2006), though we have not found academic empirical evidence to support this claim. More convincing research into events such as Hurricane Hugo (COHAN and COLE 2002) and the Oklahoma City bombing (RODGERS et al. 2005 ) has shown higher fertility levels following these mortality-enhancing events. Such research supports our argument of a link between mortality perceptions and fertility, though in reality such events, devastating as they may be to the communities involved, have a negligible effect on the mortality of a population. A recent study which demonstrates evidence of a fertility response to a mortality crisis which did have a substantial impact on nationallevel mortality rates, that associated with the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, further supports the argument that fertility rises as a direct response to mortality in ways which cannot be entirely attributed to the physiological response of the female reproductive system to child mortality. Here fertility demonstrated a sustained (10-year) rise after the mortality crisis in the late 1970s, in which 25% of the population died (HEUVELINE and POCH 2007) .
HYPOTHESIS
We predict, therefore, that mortality salience should increase fertility preferences.
METHODOLOGY
We used an internet-based questionnaire experiment to test the hypothesis that mortality priming would increase fertility preferences. Participants were randomly allocated into two conditions. The treatment condition first induced mortality salience by asking questions related to death and the process of dying, and then measured fertility preferences. The control condition reversed the two sections of the questionnaire, so that fertility preferences were elicited before mortality questions were asked. Both treatment and control conditions included a number of questions on background information at the end of the questionnaire, including age, gender, relationship status, whether they had existing children, socio-economic status, ethnicity and region of origin. Participants were all students at the London School of Economics (LSE). An email was sent to all students at the LSE inviting them to participate in the survey on 15 . Such internet surveys of student populations do not represent any kind of random sample of the UK population, or even of the student population at LSE, since participation is voluntary. However, such internet experiments allow experimental testing of a particular hypothesis: by random allocation, all factors are held constant between the treatment and control populations except for the mortality prime. And an advantage of using a non-random sample such as a student body is that they are a relatively homogenous group in terms of age, childbearing history, socio-economic status (SES) and educational level, as well as being easily accessible.
OPERATIONALISATION
We used a series of 11 closed questions on death and dying to act as mortality priming (see Appendix 1). For an internet study a series of closed questions was considered appropriate in order to minimise drop-out and to regulate the treatment. Some questions were designed to elicit information on the likely sensitivity of the respon-dent to mortality priming, to determine whether such individuals were particularly likely to demonstrate a treatment effect (such as question 11). Fertility preferences were measured in two ways. First, the desired number of children was assessed with the question 'if you could chose the ideal number of children that you would, have during your whole life, how many would that be?'. The participant's confidence in this answer was determined with the question 'In reference to the above question, how likely do you think it is that you will be able to have that number of children?' Secondly, participants were questioned on their perceptions of the costs and benefits of children. When attempting to measure change in fertility preferences it is likely that some aspects of fertility decision making will not be captured simply by questions asking for an ideal number of children. Such a response in a low-fertility country such as the UK will be largely limited to a small number of outcomes (typically zero to four), and will be discrete. It would therefore be very useful to examine the extent to which mortality salience affects the participant's attitudes towards the costs and benefits of children. These attitudes were measured via a battery of questions assessing the extent of agreement with various cost / benefit statements. For example 'children provide costs for their parents' socialising / leisure time' (see Appendix 1). We also included a smaller section measuring participants' perceptions of the financial, social, employment and emotional consequences of having children.
Given the possibility of causing distress to participants, for example those whom had suffered a recent bereavement, we included a warning on both the covering email and on the first page of the survey of the potential for emotional distress and were provided with clearance from the LSE Research Ethics Committee.
PARTICIPANTS
872 participants completed the questionnaire, which is approximately 10% of the LSE's student population. The key background features of the participants, as well as those for the entire LSE student population, are given in Table 1 . No significant differences between the treatment and control groups were found in any of the background variables, using a series of chi-square association tests (results not shown). The participants were not entirely representative of the LSE student population: women appeared to be somewhat over-represented. As expected for a student population, participants were relatively young with over 60% under the age of 25 (the modal age group for men and women being 20-24), and therefore were mostly childless and not in cohabiting relationships. The sample was also very homogenous in terms of SES, with most participants having highly educated parents from the professional/managerial social class. There was more diversity in the region of origin of participants: only about 30% originated from the UK, which approximates the proportion of UK students across the (very international) LSE student body. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Ideal Number of Children
We first used t-tests to determine whether there was a treatment effect of mortality priming on ideal number of children. We analysed each sex separately, and we also performed analysis on two different sets of participants for each sex: one including all respondents, and one excluding respondents who stated they wished to remain childless. Questions which collect information on ideal number of children are collecting information on two facets of childbearing: whether a respondent wishes to have children at all and, for those who do, how many children they would like to have. Combining these two facets into a single average family size for each group may distort the results somewhat, so we re-ran the analysis only on respondents who stated a desire for children (the sample size of respondents who wished to remain childless was too small to determine whether there was a treatment effect on this facet of childbearing). We have already determined that there are no significant differences between the treatment and control groups in any of our control variables, so are confident that the results of our univariate t-tests are not confounded by differences in the background characteristics of our two groups. We checked for the possibility of a reverse causation occurring, i.e. that the control groups' answers to mortality questions were 'primed' by the fertility questions they had answered beforehand. Chi-square tests showed no significant association between the treatment and control groups for all of the mortality priming questions (results not shown).
Costs and Benefits of Children
All questions referring to the costs and benefits of children (see Appendix 1) were coded with a 5-point Likert scale. For question 1, beneficial views of children were coded positively and costly views of children negatively. Slight agreement with each cost or benefit question was coded ±1 and strong agreement ±2. Missing and neutral values were coded as 0. In exploratory analysis, a principle component analysis was run on these attitudinal items to determine whether the 15 subquestions reduced down to a small number of components. This was examined for the whole sample, and then split by treatment, sex and then by both treatment and sex. In all cases the analysis produced at least four factors with eigen values in excess of 1 but none of the factors explained more than 22% of variance. We therefore decided it was appropriate to load all items onto a single aggregate score that would reflect an average cost and benefit attitude per participant, calculated as the sum of all items divided by the number of items for each participant. For ease of interpretation the scores were standardised around a mean of zero. As with the ideal number of children variable, we ran t-tests to determine whether the mean score differed in the treatment and control groups for each sex. Finally, we calculated an average cost/benefit score for each sub-question of the second cost/benefit question and ran t-tests to determine whether there were significant differences between the treatment and control groups when financial, careerrelated, social and emotional costs/benefits of children are considered separately.
RESULTS
Ideal Number of Children
Across all participants the mean ideal number of children was 2.40 for men and 2.48 for women. Approx 8% of participants wished to remain childless (9.0% of men and 7.7% of women). Figure 2 illustrates the effect of the treatment condition on ideal number of children for both men and women, by showing the distribution of the ideal number of children under treatment and control conditions. This suggests a slight treatment effect for men, whose ideal number of children increased from 2.29 in the control group to 2.52 with mortality priming, but not for women, whose ideal number of children was 2.47 for controls and 2.50 under the treatment condition. The difference between the mean value treatment effect for men was significant at the 10% level (t = 1.71, df = 320, p = 0.088), but not significant for women (t = 0.254, df = 518, p = 0.8). When only the set of respondents who stated a desire for children is considered the treatment effect increases for men, from 2.49 desired children in the control group to 2.79 in the treatment group, and becomes significant at the 1% level (t = 2.753 df = 291, p = 0.006). For women, the treatment 
Costs and Benefits of Children
Overall women took a more negative view of the benefits of children relative to men with a mean aggregate cost/benefit score of -.0252 (SD 0.4038) compared to a score of .0427 (SD 0.3895) for men (as these scores are standardised around 0, a negative score indicates that those participants viewed children as more costly than average; a positive score indicates viewing children as more beneficial than average). Mortality-primed males viewed children as less costly and more beneficial than control males: when all participants are considered, the score for treatment males was 0.675 (SD 0.409), the score for control males 0.018 (SD 0.368). This difference was not, however, statistically significant (t = 1.15, df = 333, p = 0.249). For women, the difference between treatment and control groups was negligible and not significant: treatment women had a mean score of -0.040 (SD 0.4194) and control women a mean of -0.011 (SD 0.388: t = -0.808, df = 530, p = 0.420). When only those participants who stated a desire for children were considered, the results were similar: treatment males had a mean score of 0.097 (SD 0.395), control males 0.039 (SD 0.349); treatment females mean score was -0.027 (SD 0.416), control females 0.012 (SD 0.378). Neither difference was statistically significant (males: t = -1.363, df = 304, p = 0.174; females: t = 1.006, df = 490, p = 0.278). Table 2 highlights the effect of mortality priming on the distribution of responses to the four attitudinal items that asked respondents to rate the extent to which children would have beneficial or costly consequences in financial, employment, social and emotional terms. Table 3 indicates the mean cost/benefit score for each question by treatment condition and sex. Both tables suggest that treatment results in both males and females viewing children as less costly and more beneficial. However t-tests indicate that none of these differences between the mean scores are significant, as set out in Table 3 (when using a Bonferonni correction for multiple tests).
DISCUSSION
The results provide two key findings: 1) There is some evidence to support the hypothesis that mortality priming increases fertility preferences.
2) This effect was largely seen in men, as women showed little evidence of a change in fertility preferences.
Mortality primed men, but not women, showed an increase in their ideal number of children, particularly if those men who wished to remain childless were excluded from the analysis. Analysis of attitudes towards the costs and benefits of children was less conclusive. Though these attitudes shifted in the predicted direction (for all measures of the costs/benefits of children, mortality primed men tended to view children as less costly than control men), these differences were not statistically significant. This provides support for the argument that fertility will increase in response to a mortality increase, and that this response may be at least partly driven by a change in fertility preferences in response to a change in mortality perceptions.
The research reported here chimes with two studies which have emerged from the social psychology literature on Terror Management Theory (TMT: SOLOMON et al. 1991) . This theory argues that humans are conscious of the inevitability of their mortality, but have developed coping strategies to exclude this fear since a permanent conscious fear of death would destroy an individual's capacity to function (BECKER 1973) . Evolutionary researchers tend to be sceptical about the theory behind this research (NAVARRETE and FESSLER 2005; but see LANDAU et al. 2007 ), but psychologists working within this paradigm have generated a considerable body of empirical evidence demonstrating that individuals do react to mortality priming in predictable ways (PYSZCZYNSKI et al. 1997) . TMT suggests that humans react to mortality salience by spreading the notion of self to a wider cultural group and hence mortality salience produces 'immortality through society'. Most of the empirical research has looked at how mortality salience acts to prompt individuals to strengthen their attachment, solidarity and defence of their social in-group and its traditional social norms. Despite the fact that children present a clear and compelling way an individual's identity and that of his/her social group can be preserved (because the parental environment will also shape the cultural identity of the child), there has been relatively little research from a TMT perspective on how mortality salience affects fertility intentions. As far as we are aware, there have been only two attempts to do so (WISMAN and GOLDENBERG 2005; FRITSCHE 2007) . WISMAN and GOLDENBERG's (2005) study, on Dutch undergraduates, found similar results to those reported here: mortality salience increased ideal number of children for men but not for women. The authors interpreted their results as the result of differential effects of having children on social and career success, which is an alternative route to mitigating one's inevitable mortality, i.e. children are more damaging to women's careers than men's. This means that the additional costs of having children for women in terms of harming their social success may reduce any potential mortality salience effects on their ideal number of children. We suggest that the differential in the costs of children for each sex more broadly may partly explain the apparently more flexible nature of men's fertility preferences than women's: the costs of bearing children are much greater for women than for men, physiologically as well as socially, so that women may show less flexibility in their reproductive preferences, and perhaps preferences for smaller family size, than men. In high fertility societies at least, where there is a difference between the sexes in ideal number of children, men tend to prefer larger families than women (e.g. RATCLIFFE et al. 2000) . Since they suffer fewer costs of bearing and raising children, men have potentially much to gain and little to lose from additional births. Females must spend nine months from conception to gestating whereas a male could die shortly after conception and the child would still have a probability of surviving and providing reproductive success. After birth women also bear the brunt of parental investment and in numerous populations child survival has shown to be more dependent upon maternal survival than paternal survival (MACE and SEAR 2005) . Such differential costs, benefits and risks may lead women to be more circumspect and less flexible in their ideal number of children. The study by FRITSCHE et al. (2007) on German undergraduates perhaps supports this hypothesis, since their results showed that mortality salience increased the fertility preferences of both sexes. However, fertility preferences were operationalised here as a desire for any children, rather than desire for a particular number of children: and both sexes need to have at least some children in order to achieve reproductive success.
CONCLUSION AND NEXT STEPS
Such research using an undergraduate population raises the question of the generalisability of these findings. We did not attempt to generate a random sample of any wider population (not even the LSE student population, as our experiment only included those who actively chose to participate). Instead, we chose to experiment on a relatively homogenous population, in terms of educational level and SES, and also childbearing experience. Our data was collected very largely from individuals who have not yet had children: fertility preferences may well change once a child has been born. Nevertheless using a randomised experimental design helps support internal validity. We found no evidence for systematic differences between the groups other than the mortality priming -suggesting our results do indicate a genuine effect of mortality priming on the fertility preferences of men, rather than the effects of confounding characteristics on fertility preferences. Next steps in this research would be to conduct similar experiments but across a wider range of participants to determine whether such an effect is seen beyond a self-selected population from one particular UK higher education institution. Another expansion of this work should also look at how mortality salience reactions are influenced by perceptions of those who are at risk of death. It is not just the overall mortality level which affects life history traits, but the age-specific pattern of mortality. Life history decisions (those affecting relative effort devoted to growth and reproduction, for example) are likely to have different payoffs in populations which have relatively high juvenile mortality than those which have relatively high adult mortality. A further experiment will test whether priming participants to think about death in childhood or infancy has a different effect to priming participants to think about their own, or other adult, deaths.
e. Children's entertainment causes substantial financial cost for their parents f. Having children provides a help to their parents' occupation g. Children provide an insurance against risk i.e. will help in the event of unemployment/ incapacity h. Having children harms their parents' physical appearance i. Children cause emotional stress for their parents j. Children provide a fulfilment for a desire to nurture k. Having children harms their parents' occupation l. Children provide support in old age m. Children provide costs for their parents' socialising / leisure time n. Having children is an economic risk o. Children provide a benefit through access to social networks 2. Respondents were asked how beneficial/costly they believed the consequence of having children were in the following fields? a. Financially b. Employment opportunities c. Socially d. Emotional wellbeing
